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We provide a simple description of the most general collective Gaussian attack in continuous
variable quantum cryptography. In the scenario of such general attacks, we analyze the asymptotic
secret-key rates which are achievable with coherent states, joint measurements of the quadratures
and one-way classical communication.
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During recent years, quantum systems with infinite di-
mensional Hilbert spaces have become the object of in-
creasing interest within the quantum information com-
munity [1]. These systems are generally called contin-
uous variable systems and their standard prototype is
given by the bosonic modes of the radiation field. In
ordinary experiments in quantum optics, bosonic modes
are generated in states with Gaussian statistics [2], and
these statistics are commonly preserved during subse-
quent optical manipulation. Further, the Gaussian statis-
tics can be preserved at the end of quantum communi-
cation lines (e.g., optical fibers), where noisy transfor-
mations of the state are induced by the interaction with
an external environment. From a theoretical point of
view, the standard model for this kind of transformation
is represented by the one-mode Gaussian channel. This is
a completely positive trace-preserving (CPT) map that
transforms Gaussian states into Gaussian states, with-
out creating any kind of correlation among the various
bosonic modes. The mathematical structure of this map
is relatively simple and has been further simplified in
Ref. [3] via the introduction of canonical forms.
In the context of continuous variable quantum key dis-
tribution (cvQKD), one-mode Gaussian channels can be
interpreted as the effect of collective Gaussian attacks.
Starting from this consideration, here we extend the re-
sults of Refs. [3, 4] to provide a full characterization of
the most general collective Gaussian attack in cvQKD.
Recall that collective Gaussian attacks have been recog-
nized as the most powerful collective attacks in cvQKD
with Gaussian resources [5]. Furthermore, under suit-
able conditions [6], collective attacks have been recently
proven to bound the most general attacks (coherent at-
tacks) against cvQKD protocols. Using our general char-
acterization of collective Gaussian attacks, we then an-
alyze the security of a cvQKD protocol, where coherent
states are used to generate secret correlations. Such a
protocol is a simple generalization of the non-switching
protocol of Ref. [7], where further post-processing of the
classical data is also used to compensate possible squeez-
ing and rotation of the output quadratures.
Let us consider a single bosonic mode, whose quadra-
tures xˆT := (qˆ, pˆ) satisfy [xˆ, xˆT ] = 2iΩ, where the matrix
Ω is defined by the entries Ω11 = Ω22 = 0 and Ω12 =
−Ω21 = 1. Every Gaussian state ρ [2] of the system is
characterized by a displacement vector x¯ := Tr(xˆρ) and
a covariance matrix V := Tr{[xˆxˆT +(xˆxˆT )T ]ρ}/2− x¯x¯T .
In a quantum communication scenario, this kind of state
can be used by a sender (Alice) to transmit classical in-
formation to a receiver (Bob) through a noisy quantum
channel. Usually, Alice chooses ρ(x¯,V) from an ensem-
ble of signal states A := {p(x¯), ρ(x¯,V)} encoding a clas-
sical variable X := {p(x¯), x¯}. This variable describes
the modulation of the displacement x¯ via some proba-
bility distribution p(x¯). The signal states are then sent
to Bob, in independent uses of the quantum channel. At
the output, Bob gets a noisy ensemble B, whose (inco-
herent) detection gives a classical variable Y which is
correlated to X (see Fig. 1, step 1). In this scenario,
the standard model for the noise process is represented
by the one-mode Gaussian channel. By definition, this
channel is a CPT map G acting on a single bosonic mode
and preserving the Gaussian statistics of the input state.
The mathematical description of this channel is fully con-
tained in a triplet {T,N,d}, where d is an R2 vector and
T,N are 2× 2 real matrices [8]. Explicitly, the action of
G(T,N,d) on a Gaussian state ρ(x¯,V) corresponds to
the simple transformations
x¯→ Tx¯ + d , V→ TVTT +N . (1)
In particular, for N = 0 and T := S symplectic (i.e.,
SΩS
T = Ω), the channel represents a Gaussian unitary.
This means that we can set G(S,0,d) := U(S,d) where
U : ρ→ UˆρUˆ † with Uˆ a unitary operator.
Remarkably, the mathematical structure of G(T,N,d)
can be further simplified thanks to recent results of
Ref. [3]. In fact, every G(T,N,d) can be decomposed as
G = UB ◦ C ◦UA, where {UA,UB} are Gaussian unitaries,
while the map C, called the canonical form, represents a
Gaussian channel with d = 0 and Tc,Nc diagonal. The
2explicit expressions of Tc and Nc depend on three sym-
plectic invariants of the channel: the generalized trans-
mission τ := detT (ranging from −∞ to +∞), the rank
r := [rk(T)rk(N)]/2 (with possible values r = 0, 1, 2) and
the temperature n¯ (which is a positive number related to
detN [9]). These three invariants {τ, r, n¯} completely
characterize the two matrices Tc,Nc and, therefore, the
corresponding canonical form C = C(τ, r, n¯). In particu-
lar, the first two invariants {τ, r} determine the class of
the form [3]. The full classification is explicitly shown in
the following table
τ r Class Form Tc Nc
0 0 A1 C(0, 0, n¯) 0 (2n¯+ 1)I
0 1 A2 C(0, 1, n¯) I+Z2 (2n¯+ 1)I
1 1 B1 C(1, 1, 0) I I−Z2
1 2 B2 C(1, 2, n¯) I n¯I
1 0 B2(Id) C(1, 0, 0) I 0
(0, 1) 2 C(Att) C(τ, 2, n¯) √τI (1 − τ)(2n¯+ 1)I
> 1 2 C(Amp) C(τ, 2, n¯) √τI (τ − 1)(2n¯+ 1)I
< 0 2 D C(τ, 2, n¯) √−τZ (1 − τ)(2n¯+ 1)I
In this table, the values of {τ, r} in the first two columns
specify a particular class A1, A2, B1, B2, C and D [10].
Within each class, the possible canonical forms are ex-
pressed in the third column, where also the third invari-
ant n¯ must be considered. The corresponding expres-
sions of Tc,Nc are shown in the last two columns, where
Z := diag(1,−1), I := diag(1, 1) and 0 is the zero matrix.
Thus, an arbitrary one-mode Gaussian channel
G(T,N,d) can be expressed by a unique canonical form
C(τ, r, n¯) up to a pair of input-output Gaussian unitaries
{UA,UB}. Now, it is known that every quantum chan-
nel can be represented by a unitary interaction coupling
the signal system to an environment, prepared in some
initial state ρE. When ρE is pure, such a dilation is
called a “Stinespring dilation” and is unique up to par-
tial isometries [11]. By extending the results of Ref. [4],
we easily construct the Stinespring dilations of all the
canonical forms. In detail, a generic C(τ, r, n¯) can be
dilated to a three-mode Gaussian unitary corresponding
to a symplectic transformation L = L(τ, r) [12]. This
transformation mixes the input state ρA with a two-
mode squeezed vacuum (TMSV) state |w〉
E
of variance
w = 2n¯+1 (see Fig. 1, step 2). Compactly, we denote by
{L(τ, r), |w〉} the Stinespring dilation of a generic canon-
ical form C(τ, r, n¯). For particular choices of the class
{τ, r}, this dilation corresponds to well-known Gaussian
models of interaction. In particular, for {τ, r} = {1, 2}, it
corresponds to a universal Gaussian cloner [13], while for
0 < τ < 1 and r = 2, it describes an entangling cloner
[14], i.e., a beam-splitter of transmission τ mixing the
signal with one mode of the TMSV state |w〉.
Thus, every one-mode Gaussian channel G(T,N,d)
can be uniquely represented by the Stinespring dilation
{L(τ, r), |w〉}, up to Gaussian unitaries {UA,UB} on the
channel and isometries on the environment E˜. By assum-
ing an environment which is bounded in Euclidean space
(i.e., a finite box), the total set of environmental modes
is countable. In such a case, the action of an isometry on
E˜ is equivalent to a unitary UˆE involving the two out-
put ancillas E˜ and all the remaining ancillas e = {ei}∞i=1
of the environment (prepared in the vacuum state). In
other words, G(T,N,d) can be represented by the max-
imal Stinespring dilation {L(τ, r)⊕ Ie, |w〉 ⊗ |0〉e}, up to
Gaussian unitaries {UA,UB} on the channel and unitaries
UˆE on the environment {E˜, e} (see Fig. 1, step 3) [15].
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FIG. 1: The general scenario in five steps. (1) Quantum
communication. Alice randomly picks signal states ρ from
an ensemble A encoding a classical variable X. At the out-
put of the channel, Bob detects the states via a quantum
measurement. The corresponding outcomes define an output
classical variable Y correlated to X. (2) One-mode Gaus-
sian channel. A one-mode Gaussian channel G corresponds
to a canonical form C up to a pair of Gaussian unitaries UA
(at the input) and UB (at the output). The central canonical
form C can be dilated to a symplectic interaction L involv-
ing two ancillary modes E := {E1, E2} prepared in a TMSV
state |w〉
E
. The dilation of the form is unique up to isome-
tries acting on E˜ := {E˜1, E˜2}. (3) Maximal dilation. By
assuming Eve is in a finite box, the dilation can be extended
(via an identity) to the remaining modes e = {ei}
∞
i=1 of the
environment (prepared in vacua). This maximal dilation of C
is now unique up to unitaries UˆE acting on {E˜, e}. (4) Col-
lective Gaussian attack. All the output ancillas {E˜, e}
provide an ensemble E , which Eve can detect to estimate X
or Y . By using an entropic bound for Eve’s accessible in-
formation, the extra ancillas and the extra unitary (dashed
boxes in the figure) can be neglected. As a consequence, only
the set G := {L(τ, r), |w〉 ,UA,UB} (solid boxes in the fig-
ure) is needed to characterize the attack. (5) Coherent-
state protocol. Alice’s signal states ρ are coherent states
|α〉 whose amplitudes encode a Gaussian variable (X = α).
Bob’s measurement is a heterodyne detection retrieving the
output amplitudes (Y = β).
Let us now consider the standard cryptographic sce-
nario, where the whole environment is under control of a
3malicious eavesdropper (Eve). For each signal state, Eve
can store the corresponding output ancillas {E˜, e} in a
quantum memory, detectable by a coherent measurement
ME at any time of the quantum communication. For in-
finite uses of the channel, the output ancillas {E˜, e} will
provide an output ensemble of states E . Such an ensem-
ble can be expressed in terms of Alice’s variable X or
Bob’s variable Y . In other words, there always exist two
coherent measurements,ME(X) andME(Y ), which are
optimal in the estimation of X and Y , respectively. This
scenario represents the most general description for a col-
lective Gaussian attack. Luckily, this description can be
greatly simplified if we adopt a suitable “entropic bound”
to restrict Eve’s accessible information on her output en-
semble E . This bound can be provided by the Holevo in-
formation, but also by the quantum mutual information
or, more generally, by the von Neumann entropy. On the
one hand, this bound enables us to ignore the details of
the quantum measurementME . On the other, since the
bound is unitarily invariant, the environmental unitary
UˆE and the extra ancillas “e” can be also neglected. As
a consequence, the attack’s description can be reduced
to the set G := {L(τ, r), |w〉 ,UA,UB}, where {τ, r, w}
are the channel symplectic invariants and {UA,UB} the
input-output Gaussian unitaries (see Fig. 1, step 4). In
particular, the Gaussian unitaries {UA,UB} are equiva-
lent to a pair of displacements {dA,dB} and a pair of
symplectic matrices {MA,MB}. These matrices may be
written as MA = (a1, a2)
T and MB = (b1,b2), where
{a1, a2,b1,b2} are R2 column-vectors. The scalar prod-
ucts of these vectors define three important parameters
{θ, θA, θB}, which contain the basic information about
the non-invariant action of the attack. Explicitly, these
parameters are θ := |a1|2 |b1|2 + 2(a1 · a2)(b1 · b2) +
|a2|2 |b2|2, θA := |a1|2 + |a2|2 and θB := |b1|2 + |b2|2.
Using the Euler decomposition [2] of the symplectic ma-
trices, we can prove the lower bounds [16]
θ ≥ 2 , θA ≥ 2 , θB ≥ 2 . (2)
Notice that we may call “canonical” the attacks of the
form C := {L(τ, r), |w〉 , IA, IB}, where I is the ideal
channel (i.e., the identity map). For this kind of attack it
is easy to prove the minimal condition θ = θA = θB = 2.
Let us now analyze the security of a cvQKD proto-
col, which is a direct generalization of the non-switching
protocol of Ref. [7]. In this protocol, Alice prepares a
coherent state |α〉 whose complex amplitude α is ran-
domly modulated by a Gaussian distribution with zero
mean and variance µ. Then, Alice sends |α〉 to Bob, who
decodes a conditional amplitude β|α by heterodyne de-
tection. Such a process is repeated many times, with
Bob getting an output random amplitude β (see Fig. 1,
step 5). At the end of the quantum communication, part
of the data {α, β} is publicly disclosed by Alice and Bob.
This step allows them to realize quantum tomography of
the Gaussian channel G(T,N,d), which completely dis-
closes T,N and d. In fact, from the analysis of the first
and second statistical moments, they can fully retrieve
the two transformations of Eq. (1). Thanks to this infor-
mation, Bob is able to process his classical data β in order
to make an optimal estimation of Alice’s signal α. Such
a classical post-processing is equivalent to inverting the
displacement transformation in Eq. (1), which generally
involves squeezing and rotation of the two quadratures.
Alternatively, Alice can exploit Eq. (1) to process her
data α and estimate Bob’s variable β. The first situation
corresponds to direct reconciliation, where α is the refer-
ence variable, decoded by Bob with the help of one-way
classical communication (CC) from Alice. By contrast,
the second situation corresponds to reverse reconciliation
[14], where β is the reference variable, decoded by Alice
with the help of one-way CC from Bob. In both cases, the
classical mutual information of Alice and Bob is given by
I(α : β) = H(β)−H(β|α), where H(· · · ) is the Shannon
entropy for bivariate Gaussian variables [17].
The Gaussian channel G(T,N,d) between the users
is the effect of a collective Gaussian attack. Bounding
Eve with the Holevo information, this attack can be fully
characterized by the set G := {L(τ, r), |w〉 ,UA,UB}. In
this description, the Holevo information I(γ : E) of Eve
on the reference variable γ = α, β can be computed
from the restricted set of ancillas E˜ (see Fig. 1). The
secret-key rate R of the protocol is then equal to R =
max{0, R(α), R(β)}, where R(γ) := I(α : β) − I(γ : E)
is the rate with respect to Alice’s variable γ = α (direct
reconciliation) or Bob’s variable γ = β (reverse reconcil-
iation). Let us consider the asymptotic secret-key rate
R∞ := limµR that can be reached in the limit of high
modulation (µ → +∞). Here, we consider all the val-
ues of the transmission τ with the exception of τ = 1.
The asymptotic rate R∞ can be easily proven to be zero
for every τ ≤ 0 [16]. By contrast, in the positive re-
gion 0 < τ 6= 1, the explicit formula of R∞ is extremely
hard to compute. For this reason, we provide a lower
bound B∞ ≤ R∞ which has the non-trivial advantage of
further simplifying the description of the attack. There-
fore, we only consider the positive range 0 < τ 6= 1 in
the remainder of the paper. It is easy to prove that the
mutual information of Alice and Bob has the asymptotic
expression limµ I(α : β) = log(µ/η), where
η :=
1
τ
[1+ τ2+(1− τ)2w2+ τθ+ |1− τ |w(τθA+θB)]1/2.
The latter quantity η represents the total noise affecting
the quantum communication. It depends on the two in-
variants {τ, w} plus the three non-invariant parameters
{θ, θA, θB} coming from {UA,UB}. Let us now bound
the Holevo information I(γ : E) of Eve. In direct rec-
onciliation, I(α : E) can be bounded using the condition
θA ≥ 2 [16], while, in reverse reconciliation, I(β : E) can
be bounded by the quantum mutual information. As a
4consequence, we get the following bound on the secret-
key rate R∞ ≥ B∞ := max{0, B∞(α), B∞(β)}, where
B∞(α) = log
(
2
e |1− τ | η
)
− g(w) + g (τ + |1− τ |w) ,
(3)
and
B∞(β) = log
(
2
e |1− τ | τη
)
− g(w) , (4)
with g(x) := [(x+1)/2] log[(x+1)/2]−[(x−1)/2] log[(x−
1)/2]. Notice that these asymptotic rates depend only on
the three parameters {τ, w, η}. In other words, the sig-
nificant information about the Gaussian attack G is fully
contained in the triplet {τ, w, η}, where τ and w are sym-
plectic invariants of the channel, while η includes the non-
invariant effect of the input-ouput unitaries {UA,UB}.
Such a triplet is completely known to the honest users
thanks to the tomography of the channel and, therefore,
the corresponding value of B∞ can be easily derived.
It is now interesting to analyze the performances of the
canonical attacks in terms of the asymptotic rate B∞.
It is easy to show that, for fixed invariants τ and w,
canonical attacks are the less perturbative and less pow-
erful attacks. In fact, for a canonical attack, we have
θ = θA = θB = 2, so that the total noise η takes the
minimum value
η = 1+
1
τ
+
|1− τ |
τ
w := ηc(τ, w) . (5)
Then, since B∞ is monotonic in η [according to Eqs. (3)
and (4)], the minimization of η is equivalent to the max-
imization of B∞ (for fixed τ and w). By contrast,
we can easily prove that the canonical attacks are the
most powerful Gaussian attacks for fixed transmission
τ and total noise η. In other words, for every Gaus-
sian attack, with triplet {τ, w, η}, there always exists a
canonical attack, with triplet {τ, w′ ≥ w, η}, such that
B∞(τ, w
′, η) ≤ B∞(τ, w, η). The proof is very easy. The
noise η of an arbitrary Gaussian attack G with {τ, w, η}
is minimized by the noise ηc(τ, w) of a canonical attack C
with {τ, w, ηc(τ, w)}. Now, let us increase w while keep-
ing τ fixed in {τ, w, ηc(τ, w)}. From Eq. (5), we see that
ηc(τ, w) increases in w and, therefore, we can choose a
value w′ ≥ w such that ηc(τ, w′) = η. Then, we get a
new canonical attack C′ with triplet {τ, w′, η}. But now,
also the two quantities g(w) and g(w) − g(τ + |1 − τ |w)
are increasing in w. Therefore, for fixed τ and η, the con-
dition w′ ≥ w minimizes the rates of Eqs. (3) and (4),
which concludes the proof. By combining the previous
results on the asymptotic rate B∞(τ, w, η), we deduce
that canonical attacks can be seen as extremal Gaussian
attacks, since they provide upper bounds for fixed {τ, w}
and lower bounds for fixed {τ, η}.
In conclusion, we have given a simple and compact
description of a completely general collective Gaussian
attack. Using such a characterization, we have derived
the asymptotic secret-key rates that are reachable by a
protocol using coherent states, joint measurements of the
quadratures, and one-way classical communications. In
particular, the secret-key rates can be bounded by rela-
tively simple quantities depending on three channel pa-
rameters only. In terms of these bounds, a particular
class of attacks (canonical attacks) can be considered as
extremal. Finally, this work paves the way for completely
general security analyses of cvQKD protocols, where ex-
plicit derivations of secret-key rates can be made without
any assumptions on the eavesdropper’s interaction.
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